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Abstract  
Has Japan’s post-Second World War transformation into one of the most militarily capable 
nations been the result of 60 years of truly representative government? This research compares 
government-collected opinion polls to policy trends and actions, to determine whether the case of 
Japan’s remilitarization argues for or against the country’s democratic quality. For the purpose of 
this research, the size of Japan’s military and its legislative freedom to act as a more 
conventional military were considered the most pertinent militarization policies. Results 
indicated that those policies were consistently unjustified by measured opinion, suggesting elitist 
policy formation. However, other policy areas, such as Japan’s military budget, participation in 
UN peacekeeping, and national defense capability, have indicated a more pluralist model of 
policy formation. Therefore, results suggest that the country’s remilitarization has been the 
product of both elitist and pluralist governance. 
Keywords: democracy, pluralism and elitism, public opinion and polls, self-defense forces  
Introduction  
The remilitarization of Japan has been shaped by a multitude of foreign and domestic factors. To 
understand a minute facet of that phenomenon, this research focuses upon the nation’s military 
policy through the lens of elitism and pluralism. Its approach offers a domestic angle in which to 
analyze the nature of Japan’s representative democracy. Thus, it asks whether, in remilitarizing 
Japan, government elites have acted in response to public opinion or ignored the electorate. This 
study hypothesizes that, considering Japan’s past subjection to military rule and traumatic losses 
during the Second World War era, as well as the less democratic persistence of a one-party 
dominant system, elites likely ignored measured opinion while remilitarizing the nation. 
 
Article 9 of Japan’s constitution states that “the Japanese people forever renounce war as a 
sovereign right of the nation,” and that “land, sea, and air forces, as well as other war potential, 
will never be maintained” (Umeda, 2006). As the constitution has never been amended, the 
words of the document remain as clear today as they were when written in 1946 (Europa World 
Plus, 2017a). However, Japan has an active military of 247,000 personnel, 690 tanks, 339 
combat planes, 220 weaponized helicopters, and 66 militant ships and submarines (The 
International Institute of Strategic Studies, 2017). Additionally, 56,000 reserve troops stand 
ready to engage in warfare. In fact, Japan’s military has been ranked the seventh most powerful 
military in the world (GlobalFirePower, 2017). Considering the contradiction between Japan’s 
constitution and the actual state of its military, it is relevant to ask how democratic its 
militarization has been. 
 
The idea of democracy is to allow citizens to present their opinion to influence and collectively 
control government policy. According to Kobayashi (2012: 1), “pure democracy is physically 
and logistically impossible [democracies] use representatives to debate and hand down decisions 
in [the citizenry’s] place.” Thus, a representative that does not act in the interests of his/her 
constituents is not truly “a representative” in a democracy. It is arguable that elected officials 
may occasionally disobey the public’s wishes to protect the nation. However, doing so more 
often than in extreme situations arguably negates the notion that elected officials represent the 
public, and that the public is in control. 
 
While this standard is not always met in the world’s democracies, the goal of placing power in 
the hands of the people makes constituent-conscious representation desirable. In many countries, 
the democratic nature of representation is supported by the ability to choose between many 
politicians and parties. Parties that fail to act in the people’s interest are not elected in the next 
election, giving the people discretionary power similar to an employer. 
 
However, it is difficult to hold politicians accountable in Japan’s one-party dominant political 
system. The leading party, the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP), has been in power for almost the 
entirety of Japan’s post-war era. Thus, it has comparatively little incentive, at least in theory, to 
pay attention to the voters, reducing the power of the Japanese people to enforce democratic 
representation (Kobayashi, 2012: 2). Given the LDP’s dominance, the question emerges as to 
whether the country’s militarization has been the result of effective representation of Japanese 
public opinion (Midford, 2011: 2). 
 
The issue of public influence in Japanese politics has remained pertinent since the beginning of 
the Meiji era, a political period that began in the 1860s and encompassed most of the time before 
the reign of Emperor Hirohito, who ruled Japan through the Second World War. Meiji political 
scientists referred to public opinion using two terms, “yoron” and “seron” (Midford, 2011: 11). 
“Yoron” was used by those who considered public opinion to be molded by elites, reflecting the 
sentiment of contemporary “elitists” (Midford, 2011: 9–10). Elitists feel that public opinion 
fluctuates inconsistently and is far too incoherent to properly influence policy formation 
(Midford, 2011: 9–10). In contrast, “seron” was used by those who felt that public opinion 
referred to the collage of opinions the community held at the time (Midford, 2011: 11). The term 
demonstrates an appreciation of the Japanese public as capable of coherent opinion formation 
and majority consensus in general public policy. Modern day pluralists argue that public opinion 
is powerful enough to influence elite decision making. While the public can rarely decide 
specific policy, pluralists feel that Japanese citizens constrain elites to a community-formed 
realm of acceptable policy outcomes. Such constraints are defined by the outcomes excluded in 
the array of public policy desires (Midford, 2011: 12). Despite the juxtaposition between elitist 
and pluralist answers to the policy influence debate, public opinion is likely a combination of the 
two, conditional by policy realms and issues. 
 
Debates regarding public opinion are complicated by the disconnect between true policy opinion 
and measurable opinion. As poll data is collected, responses can be influenced by how a question 
is worded. For example, poll respondents were asked in 1961 which of four roles was the most 
important of the SDF, one of which was national defense. However, in 2015, poll respondents 
were asked to identify the purpose of the SDF, of which one of four possible answers was 
national defense (内閣府, 2012). Arguably, the difference in semantics poses an issue as to 
whether responses can be considered equally. Even if syntax remains constant between polls, 
interpretation of the question may differ based on current context. However, consistent trends in 
measured opinion can support the validity of the data gathered and the coherent and stable nature 
of public opinion (Midford, 2011: 172). 
 
Opinion polls in Japan have consistently demonstrated a general lack of support for militarism 
and military endeavors, especially of the offensive sort that dominated pre-Second World War 
imperialist Japan. Since the war, traditional militarism has faltered due to a general distrust of the 
military and of the “state’s ability to control it” (Midford, 2011: 14). The public’s doubts about 
state control are based on the military’s willingness to end civilian government in the mid-1930s 
(Midford, 2011: 14). Thus, when the Self Defense Forces were formed in 1954 from the National 
Police Reserve, a defense force created in 1950, elites were cognizant of the need to appease 
both domestic and international concerns about Japanese militarism (Hook et al., 2011: 129; 
Japan Ministry of Defense, 2006; Miller, 2011). Public support “was predicated on the 
assumption that [the] primary role [of the SDF] would be nonmilitary disaster relief…[while] 
national defense was considered [of] secondary importance” (Midford, 2011: 14). Japanese 
support for defensive realism, the doctrine that a state must be militarily prepared to protect 
itself, remained low until the end of the Cold War. In the dawn of the 1990s, rising concerns 
about a North Korean threat, Chinese militarization, and the loss of US protection through the 
fight against communism overshadowed the more standard worries about getting roped into 
American conflicts (Midford, 2011: 14, 15, 17; Yakushiji, 2015). Despite the emergence of 
defensive realism, the new era has failed to reinvigorate public support for goal-oriented 
offensive militarism, for example that practiced by the United States in invading Afghanistan 
(Midford, 2011: 27). The contrast between Japanese defensive realism and recent militaristic 
developments (see Figures 2 and 3) calls to light the question of whether Japan’s remilitarization 
has been the product of elites shaping public opinion, of ignoring public opinion, or of 
representing it (Midford and Scott, 2008). 
 
Hawkish policy makers may have militarized Japan through their success at shaping public 
support for combative legislation (Midford, 2011: 9). However, a more negative sign for Japan’s 
democracy is the possibility that in militarizing Japan, elitist politicians have ignored public 
opinion completely. Alternatively, it is reasonable to assert that Japan’s militarization may have 
been the pluralist result of a public that desires Japan to have an adequate military. After all, 
almost all other countries in the world—democracies included—have some sort of offensively 
capable military, which the Japanese may feel is the right of any normal sovereign nation. 
 
In order to understand the relationship between Japan’s measured opinions and militarization 
policies, poll results were collected from over 30 Japanese Cabinet Office surveys from the last 
six decades and compared to political and military actions of the Japanese government. Given 
the complexity of Japan’s militarization, the relationships between public opinion and 
government action were compared in policy categories (national defense legislation, annual 
budget, etc.) to determine whether certain aspects of Japan’s militarization were more responsive 
to public opinion than others. 
Method  
Polls conducted and published by the Yomuiri Shimbun, a Japanese newspaper, were included to 
demonstrate public support from 2002 to 2017 for amending Article 9 of the constitution to 
allow for explicit militarization. As Article 9 has never been amended, poll support for 
amendment was included to contextualize Japan’s militarization, rather than to compare to any 
government actions. The Yomiuri Shimbun was also used as a source for poll data regarding 
support for combating terrorism in 2002. The newspaper’s articles were collected using the 
Access World News (2017) database, a database of NewsBank Inc., and the Yomidas Rekishikan 
database, at the Asian Reading Room of the Library of Congress (Madison, 2017). All other 
polls were accessed at 世論調査(全調 査表示), a web page maintained by the Cabinet Office of 
Japan. Polls generally surveyed 1000– 3000 randomly selected participants, reflective of the 
Japanese population. 
 
Data was collected by searching for survey questions that reflected the general question of each 
of six categories. These general questions (see Figures 1–7) allowed for data to be collected 
despite the dynamic nature of survey question syntax. Answers were recorded as percentages in 
support of militaristic action or militarism, so that higher percentages always indicate higher 
support for militarization. Percentages of anti-militaristic and indifferent responses to the survey 
questions were not used in this research.  
 Figure 1. Poll support for amending the constitution. 
 
Figure 2. Militarization polls vs legislation and action. 
 Figure 3. Militarization polls vs number of personnel and combative vehicles. 
 
Figure 4. Military budget polls vs military budget. 
 Figure 5. National defense role polls vs national security efforts and legislation. 
 
Figure 6. Terrorism and piracy polls vs terrorism and piracy legislation. 




Results suggest a trend in which more militaristic matters vary directly with indications of 
elitism. Figures 2 and 3 focus on support for making Japan’s military stronger or more 
offensively militaristic, making those categories the most related to Japan’s accession into a 
military power. Accordingly, the legislation and statistics they present suggest the greatest case 
for elitism in the study. Figures 4 and 6 pertain to the funding of the SDF and international 
operations that are policing and protective measures, and thus less militaristic than other 
combative operations. Suitably, they present cases of general pluralism, but with ambiguous or 
pluralistically questionable aspects. Figures 5 and 7 address exclusively defensive militarism and 
UN directed peacekeeping. They demonstrate strong accounts of pluralism, sealing the trend. 
 
Context for this research is found in the two sets of public opinion data regarding amending 
Article 9, displayed in Figure 1. Data from 1956 to 1965 was accessed from the Cabinet Office’s 
polls, and data from 2002 to 2017 was published by the Yomuiri Shimbun. 
Figure 1 questions: Support for amending Article 9 of the constitution: Should the constitution be 
revised to allow Japan to militarize?  
The first indication of the public’s view on amending Article 9 suggests a strong lack of desire to 
do so. The 1956 poll represents the point at which the public’s concern for the Second World 
War might be at its most salient, assuming a general decline in influence as the war lost its 
immediacy (内閣府, 2012). Japan’s return to normalcy may have been accelerated as the LDP 
began to drop the issue of national security from their platform to focus on Japan’s remarkable 
economic growth (Catalinac, 2016: 3). 
 
Figure 1 also makes it clear that support for amending Article 9 has been consistently higher in 
the last 15 years than it was in the decades following the war (内閣府, 2012). This may also be 
attributed to the major party’s platform, as the LDP began to “increase their discussion of 
national security in the first election after the 1993 electoral reform” (Catalinac, 2016: 9). The 
electoral reform eliminated competition between LDP candidates in each voting district. Before 
1993, LDP members were forced to resort to promising their constituents particularistic goods, 
also known as engaging in pork barrel politics, because they could not differentiate their 
programmatic party platform from the other LDP members running in their district. Now that 
LDP candidates only face competition from minor party members, they can resort to more party-
specific programmatic campaigning (Catalinac, 2016: 2). Programmatic campaigning has led the 
major party to push the issue of national security back into the public spotlight, providing a 
possible explanation for recent interest in amending the constitution (Catalinac, 2016: 3). 
 
Foreign policy has also played a considerable role in the rise of popular interest in amending 
Article 9. Japan’s military buildup, as seen through the lens of foreign affairs, has originated 
largely from the United States’ involvement in the Cold War, as America sought Japan’s support 
opposing the eastern communist threat (Wittner, 1976). Contemporaneous militarization can be 
attributed to foreign policy after the Cold War, as the United States is no longer invested in 
protecting their capitalist ally, and Japan is threatened by China’s military buildup and North 
Korea’s hostility (Midford, 2011: 14, 15, 17; Yakushiji, 2015). Thus, the accumulation of 
support to amend Article 9 may be attributed to a desire to recognize that militarization. 
 
Finally, the data indicates that, in the last 15 years, the majority of Japanese citizens did not 
support amending Article 9 until 2017 (内閣府, 2012; ヨミダス歴史館, 2017). If the LDP is 
motivated by public support, Japan may be on the brink of amending the constitution. While it is 
unclear whether recent support has been the result of elite influence over foreign policy or a 
grass roots movement, a case for the elitist or pluralist nature of support for amendment can be 
strengthened by the subsequent research’s findings in other areas. 
 
In the following figures, indicators of applicable government actions are included as circular 
marks with a “Y”, an “N”, or a “U”. “Y” (Yes) indicates that the action seems to have been 
conducted in accordance with measured public opinion, “N” (No) indicates that the action seems 
to have been conducted without regard for measured public opinion, and “U” (Unknown) 
indicates that the nature of the action’s popular support is not known to this research. 
Government actions and their interpretation are detailed and contextualized as they relate to this 
research. For access to the data spreadsheet and supplementary information regarding the 
intricacies of legislation, government actions, polls, and statistics, visit the website for this 
research (see supplemental material). 
 
The first result is displayed in Figure 2, which compares support for militarization to Japanese 
legislation and government announcements regarding the SDF. The second set of results is 
displayed in Figure 3, which compares the same polls to the number of personnel and combat 
vehicles in Japan’s military over time. Vehicle data was collected by the Statistics Bureau of the 
Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications of Japan. Data regarding personnel was 
provided by the Statistics Bureau of the Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications of 
Japan, the Statesman’s Yearbook Archives, the US Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, the 
IISS Military Balance publications collected by the World Bank, and Europa World Online. The 
goal of Figures 2 and 3 is to see whether the government has responded to public opinion when 
expanding the size, power, and combative freedom of the SDF.  
Figure 2 questions: Support for militarizing the SDF: Do you support increasing the armament of 
and number of personnel in Japan’s Army, Air Force, and/or Navy? Support for making the SDF 
more capable: Do you feel that Japan needs to strengthen the personnel, weapons, and/or 
capability of the Self Defense Forces in order to protect the security of the country from foreign 
and domestic threats, to make Japan more independently capable in this manner? 
The militarization polls (1956–2015) included in Figures 2 and 3 indicate that both questions 
measuring public opinion fail to report popular support in any year for an increase in the military 
capability of the SDF (内閣府, 2012). Thus, the government has collected steady evidence that 
the people have not desired further militarization, and yet has continued to militarize. Without 
indication of majority support, increasing the freedom of the SDF to operate internationally and 
in some cases combatively is unsupported by measured public opinion. The creation of the 
National Police Reserve in 1950 and that of the SDF in 1954 have not been included in the 
following analysis, as the earliest Cabinet Office polls available are from 1956. The first three 
actions marked “Y” are government announcements defining the mission of the SDF. They first 
define the SDF as a force for providing national security, international aid, peace, and the goals 
of the United Nations (防衛省, 2017). The next government point in Figure 2 reiterates that the 
purpose of the SDF is to defend Japan (‘The World and Japan’ Database, 1976), while the third 
in 1995 is an update of the SDF’s mission statement to address the foreign policy challenges of a 
world recovering from Soviet power (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, 1995). As none of 
these actions increase the power of the SDF as a military force, they were considered supported 
by public opinion, suggesting that the second half of the century’s militarization policies were 
pluralist. 
 
The first seemingly unsupported legislation was enacted as the century concluded. It allowed the 
SDF to use weapons to defend themselves, Japanese nationals, and foreign nationals in 
conducting rear operations in non-combat zones (see Law to Amend Part of the SDF Law, Act 
61, of 1999). In addition, it allowed the “SDF to use force if necessary in marine non-combat 
zones outside of Japanese territory…to aid the operations of the United States in the name of 
Japan’s defense” (Madison, 2017; House of Representatives, Japan, 2014; Shugiin, 2014). The 
expansion of operations outside of Japanese territory is an expansion in the ability of the SDF to 
behave more combatively, an indication of militarization that demonstrates elitist policy creation, 
as polls did not suggest support for increasing the power of the SDF to engage in more 
aggressive combat. 
 
In 2001 the basic law of the SDF was amended to allow the SDF to operate in territories that 
could potentially become combative, if combat was not currently underway (see Act No. 115 of 
2001) (House of Representatives, 2014). As deployment to potentially combative areas brought 
the SDF closer to the freedom of a conventional military to engage in combat zones, the 
legislation seems unsupported by measured opinion which has not indicated support for further 
military normalcy. Additionally notable in the militarization of the SDF are the 2003 amendment 
to the SDF Law, which allows the SDF to seize property and land for operations, and the 2003 
Iraq Special Measures Law, which allowed the SDF to be dispatched to Iraq in non-combative 
support operations for the United States, despite the combative nature of Iraq at that time 
(Umeda, 2006). While the seizure of land and property may ultimately be necessary to protect 
Japan, easing the regulations which restrict the right of the SDF to seizure expanded the potential 
of the SDF to abuse its power. Deployment in Iraq also seems to have ignored the lack of 
measured support for further militarization, as permitting the SDF to be dispatched to a country 
of frequent “small-scale fighting” (Umeda, 2006) further increased the power of the SDF to 
engage in militaristic situations (Madison, 2017). Such legislative risks loosened the reins of the 
SDF, contributing to its transformation into a standard military force, which was not supported 
by polls regarding militarization. 
 
However, the most notable militarization measures were passed in 2015. The Peace and Security 
laws amended the SDF Law to allow forces to be dispatched to areas of active combat to aid the 
United States, and to use weapons in the exercise of collective self-defense (Cabinet Secretariat, 
201). Collective self-defense is the right of standard military forces to defend their allies, a 
notion which allows the SDF to operate more as a conventional combative international force. 
Many Japanese citizens responded unfavorably, as tens of thousands protested in front of the 
Diet building as the legislation was passed. Protestors felt that the legislation violated the 
constitution to the point that the law may as well have been a constitutional amendment enacted 
without undergoing proper voting procedure. Citizens were also concerned that a policy of 
collective self defense would pull Japan into other countries’ wars to protect its allies (Yakushiji, 
2015). The Tokyo Foundation asserts that “in public opinion polls, between 70% and 80% of 
respondents… opposed the new security laws,” increasing indications that the laws were elitist 
(Yakushiji, 2015). The transformation from being restricted to Japanese territory to having the 
freedom to operate in combat missions abroad has redefined the character of the SDF, a 
legislative maneuver that was conducted without regard for government measured opinion polls. 
Furthering the notion of government autonomy, these measures complement a legislative 
military history that seems to support an elitist view of policy formation. 
 
Figure 3 compares the same militarization polls to the number of SDF personnel and total 
military combat vehicles. It indicates that these numbers have risen dramatically despite the lack 
of popular support for militarization. For the purposes of this research, military combat vehicles 
are defined as vehicles designed to be used as weapons, including but not limited to destroyers, 
tanks, and fighter planes. Therefore, vehicles designed solely for transport are not included. The 
number of personnel in the SDF has risen from 121,752 in 1952 (Statesman’s Yearbook, 2017) 
to 247,150 in 2016 (Europa World Plus, 2017b). At its peak in 2005, the SDF had about 272,000 
personnel (World Bank, 2017). The number of combative vehicles in the SDF has risen from 288 
in 1952 to 4185 in 2004 (第31章防衛, 1996) Translation: Chapter 31 Defense. Notably, the 
majority of this inflation occurred between 1952 and 1961, during which time the number of 
personnel doubled, and the number of combative military vehicles rose by over 3000. As the 
SDF was considered a purely defensive organization during this time and legislation to increase 
its military freedom did not emerge until the turn of the millennium, this increase in hard power 
was likely motivated by the desire to have an effective means of defense, rather than creating a 
more offensively capable force. While the implications of defensive ambition are more favorable 
than aggression in the eyes of anti-militarists, the SDF’s acquisitions in the 1950s still molded it 
into a vastly more powerful military force. As government surveys on support for military 
expansion are not available until that of 1956, respect for public opinion in policy formation 
before then is unknown. However, measured opinion indicates that support from 1956–1961 was 
at most 31%, demonstrating that this period of the buildup of the SDF in the decade following its 
creation was seemingly elitist (内 府, 2012). Consistently low support for further militarism 
extends the trend of elitist military buildup to 2015, when the government last measured public 
opinion. 
 
The third category is displayed in Figure 4, which compares polls to the military budget of Japan 
as a percentage of the Japanese gross domestic product (GDP), and includes a statement by 
Prime Minister Abe announcing the end of the 1% GDP cap on military funding. Military budget 
data was accessed from the SIPRI Military Expenditure Database. Results indicate whether 
public opinion polls have supported military funding, and whether funding has respected 
measured opinion.  
Figure 4 questions: Support for increasing the SDF budget: Do you feel that as a percentage of 
the national budget, the budget of the SDF should be greater? 
Figure 4 demonstrates that poll support for increasing the budget of the SDF has been less than 
30 percent from 1961 to 2003 (内閣府, 2012). Accordingly, the budget of Japan’s military has 
remained relatively constant since the Second World War, within three percent of GDP 
(Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, 2017). As majority support for increasing the 
budget has been absent, the government’s actions from 1952 to 2016 have respected public 
opinion. Such discipline suggests a pluralist theory of policy formation. However, it is notable 
that while the budget of the SDF has remained constant as a percentage of GDP, its value has 
risen from 7,140,000,000 in 1952 to 415,690,00,000 in 2016, in constant 2015 US dollars 
(Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, 2017). The post-war rise in Japan’s GDP has 
allowed the SDF budget to increase without violating the 1% of GDP cap, which the SDF has 
been informally limited to since the 1960s (Kaneko, 2017). Thus, it is possible that elites believe 
they can ignore measured opinion against increasing the SDF budget if they can use the 1% gap 
to placate public concerns, which weakens the case for pluralist formation of the military budget. 
 
Budget policy shifted significantly in March of 2017, when the prime minister released a 
statement that “there is no such thinking to keep defense budget below 1 percent of GDP under 
the Abe administration” (Kaneko, 2017). Increasing spending by exceeding the 1% GDP ceiling 
would not be warranted by measured opinion leading up to 2003, but as the Cabinet Office has 
not polled citizens about raising the budget of the SDF since then, support for this statement is 
unknown. Additionally, it is currently unknown to this research if the 2017 budget surpassed 1% 
of Japan’s GDP. Therefore, the representative value of Abe’s declaration cannot be properly 
evaluated in this study. 
 
The fourth category is displayed in Figure 5, which compares polls to military deployment and 
legislation regarding the use of the SDF to protect Japan. Results indicate whether increasing the 
ability of the SDF to be used in national defense has been supported by measured opinion. 
Figure 5 questions: Support for National Defense as the most important SDF Role: Do you feel 
that the most important duty or one of the most important duties (depending on question 
language and number of possible answers) of the Self Defense Force is to ensure national 
defense? 
Figure 5 displays the public’s opinion regarding whether the primary objective of the SDF is to 
secure national security. The figure demonstrates the positive slope of public opinion trends, 
indicating that citizens have gradually accepted the SDF’s role as a military force for national 
security. Up until 1969, the majority of those polled had considered the primary purpose of the 
SDF to be other than national security, including but not limited to disaster relief, humanitarian 
aid, and domestic security (内閣府, 2012). However, by 2015 the SDF was considered to exist 
primarily for national security by almost 75 percent of the population. 
 
Perhaps in addition to the end of the Cold War and the threat of militant neighboring nations, 
support for national security can be attributed to a public long removed from war, which has 
grown comfortable admitting its military force is designed to protect Japan from international 
aggression. While Japan was never expected to surrender immediately given a confrontation, the 
combative connotations of national security were frowned upon in early post-war Japan, which 
was ever conscious of avoiding accusations that it had the desire to once again become a 
threatening military power (Midford, 2011: 1, 2). Rising emphasis on national security reflects 
the traditional purpose of most national militaries, suggesting Japan’s admittance of the capacity 
to wage defensive warfare has come with time. 
 
Popular support for transforming the SDF into an organization dedicated primarily for national 
defense seems to have been accompanied by attentive legislation. Polls suggest that the major 
legislative actions undertaken from 1999 to 2015 enjoyed majority support. Approval of 
increasing defensive capability only dipped below 50% once between 1969 and 2017, only to 
rebound immediately, and before the first applicable government action. Such remarkably 
consistent data suggests that public opinions regarding national defense have been very clear, 
contending the elitist argument that poll results are inconsistent and therefore incapable of 
influencing policy. 
 
The 1994 dip in support for national defense as the “primary objective” of the SDF was caused 
by an 8.1% increase in respondents reporting disaster relief as the most important role, compared 
to 1991’s responses (内閣府, 2012). The results may be attributed to the 1993 Hokkaido 
earthquake, which killed about 200 people (NOAA Data Catalog, 2017). However, support for 
the national defense role rebounded quickly. After the devastating Kobe earthquake of 1995, 
respondents were told to choose two primary roles for the SDF. 66.0% of respondents chose 
disaster relief as one of their answers, and 57.2% chose national security (内閣府, 2012). The 
resolve of support for national security through natural disasters indicates that the public’s 
concerns for Japan’s security demanded the SDF’s top priority be the security of the nation 
(Asahi Shimbun, 2017). 
 
The first national security event occurred in Japanese waters in 1999, when the MSDF, the 
marine branch of the Self Defense Forces, fired warning shots at DPRK (North Korean) ships. 
As the SDF Law (Act No. 165 of June 9, 1959) allows the SDF to engage forces trespassing in 
Japanese territory, the actions of the SDF were justified in ensuring Japan’s national security 
(Cabinet Secretariat, 2015). The SDF Law and the Japan Coast Guard Law were later amended 
in 2001 to explicitly grant the MSDF and the Japanese Coast Guard the right “to fire on 
suspicious vessels, if necessary, in order to search them in Japanese waters” (Umeda, 2006). In 
2003, a law was passed to allow the SDF to “mobilize [to prepare for] an anticipated foreign 
attack before the attack is imminent” (Madison, 2017). Loosening the procedures restricting the 
ability of the SDF to mobilize and apprehend security threats indicates Japan’s priority shift from 
preventing the government from losing control of the SDF to ensuring Japan’s protection. As 
measured opinions have supported ensuring national security is as the priority of the SDF, the 
resultant remilitarization is considerably pluralist in nature. 
 
The next three actions reflect the path of gradually awarding the SDF greater freedom to act to 
better protect the nation. Laws were passed to allow the SDF to engage in non-combative support 
activities for the United States in 2004 (Umeda, 2006), Australia in 2012 (House of 
Representatives, Japan, 2014), and finally with any other country in 2015 (Cabinet Secretariat, 
2015.), if the activities support the defense of Japan and do not place Japanese forces in combat 
situations. Thus, while the Peace and Safety Laws allow the SDF to engage in combative 
collective self-defense with the United States (see Figure 2), the laws only authorize non-
combative support operations with other countries. These operations include the transport of 
soldiers and supplies, as well as other services that do not place SDF soldiers at sites of current 
combat. As these actions and laws allow the SDF to more effectively defend Japan without 
increasing its militant freedom, they are supported by measured opinion. 
Additionally, the presence of majority support 30 years before legislative action suggests that, in 
the matter of national security, the government has acted in response to public opinion, rather 
than shaping it by persuasively selling its recent actions. As responsiveness best fits the values of 
democracy, the formation of national security policy contributes to the case for a pluralist pattern 
of Japan’s remilitarization. 
 
The fifth category (Figure 6) seeks to determine whether the government acted in response to 
public opinion in allowing the SDF to be used to combat international terrorism and maritime 
piracy. 
Figure 6 questions: Support for combating piracy: Should the SDF be dispatched to combat 
piracy off the east coast of Africa? Support for combating terrorism: Should the SDF be utilized 
to respond to international terrorism?  
Figure 6 presents two laws, the 2001 Anti-Terror Special Measures Law, and the 2009 Act on the 
Punishment of Piracy and Dealing with Piracy. The first allows the SDF to conduct non-
combative support operations for the United States discussed in Act No. 60 of 1999 (see Figure 
2) to combat terror. The SDF must maintain consent from the destination country before being 
deployed on foreign soil, which prevents the law from being misconstrued to allow for military 
attack or occupation (Umeda, 2006). Due to the expansion of freedom introduced by Act No. 60 
of 1999, the SDF may use weapons to protect themselves and those in their custody. The law 
regarding piracy allows the SDF to conduct patrols and escort missions to protect ships in the 
Gulf of Aden (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, 2016). 
 
Displayed in conjunction are polls measuring support for deploying the SDF to combat terror and 
piracy. The cases present differing relationships between polls and action. As the Cabinet Office 
only surveyed the public regarding terrorism in 2003 and the Yomiuri Shimbun only surveyed on 
the subject in 2002, it is unknown to this study whether the public supported the fight against 
terrorism before the government passed its legislation. While it is difficult to argue that the 
formation of the Anti-Terror Special Measures Law demonstrates elitism, the absence of an 
attempt to measure public opinion prior to policy is damaging to the pluralist case, when 
compared to more clearly pluralist categories (see Figures 5 and 7). However, the Act on the 
Punishment of Piracy and Dealing with Piracy is consistent with pluralist theory in that it has the 
support of measured public opinion. A Cabinet Office poll regarding piracy was conducted in 
2009, suggesting that before the law was enacted 63.2 percent of the public favored combating 
terrorism (内閣府, 2012). The act of polling citizens prior to policy output and the congruence 
between measured opinion and policy indicate that, in the case of combating piracy, the Japanese 
government operated with respect for the opinions of the electorate, contributing to the case of 
pluralist democracy. 
 
The sixth category compares support for deployment in UN PKOs (peace keeping operations) 
with the SDF’s engagement in PKOs, and with legislation allowing the SDF greater freedom in 
doing so. As peacekeeping operations afford the SDF the power to operate internationally, it is 
notable to consider whether such expansion of the military’s role was conducted with 
consideration for measured opinion.  
Figure 7: Support for participation in UNPKOs: Do you think that the SDF should answer 
requests from the UN to dispatch to foreign countries for peacekeeping operations? 
The Cabinet Office did not measure public support for UN PKOs between 1965 and 1991. 
Japan’s eventual interest in peacekeeping operations may have been related to the rise in the 
number of UNPKOs conducted after the Cold War. The evaporation of US-Soviet tension 
allowed countries to alleviate intra-state and inter-state conflicts without agitating bipolar 
loyalties, resulting in a sudden boom in peacekeeping operations between 1989 and 1994 (United 
Nations, 2017a). As the plurality of respondents supported deploying the SDF for UNPKOs in 
1991, the Act on Cooperation in United Nations Peacekeeping Operations in 1992 is considered 
by this research as supported by the population, and indicates a case of pluralist reaction to 
public opinion. As plurality soon led to consistent majority support starting in 1995, Japan’s 
participation in UN PKOs is considered supported by public opinion (内閣府, 2012). 
Additionally, trends of measured opinion reflect the consistency of national security polls (see 
Figure 6), further supporting the pluralist argument. 
 
Japan’s UN policy led the SDF to Angola, Cambodia, and Mozambique from 1993 to 1995, the 
Syrian-Israeli territory of the Golan Heights from 1996 to the present, and South Sudan from 
2011 to 2017 (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, 2005).While the SDF’s participation in these 
missions was and remains contingent upon a cease fire having been established and consistently 
honored, the participation listed involved the deployment of SDF soldiers or military officers 
(United Nations, 2017b). Notably, critics have argued that South Sudan remained an area of 
armed conflict during the SDF’s deployment, violating the terms of Japan’s UN PKO law (Kubo 
et al., 2017). Regardless, the overwhelming support for UNPKO missions from70.1%in 2003 to 
91.3%in 2015 supports the democratic merit of allowing the SDF to conduct their non-combative 
support operations for the UN in South Sudan (内閣府, 2012). In another conceivably 
controversial implementation of policy, the 2015 Peace and Safety Laws included an amendment 
to allow the SDF to conduct defensive PKOs (Cabinet Secretariat, 2015). As the SDF gained the 
freedom to protect their soldiers with weaponry when deployed abroad in 1999 (see Figure 2), 
the law does not increase the military power of the SDF, and thus is considered supported by the 
polls supporting UN PKO involvement. 
 
Considering the preemptive nature of opinion gathering, the policies implemented after 1991 
seem to be in response to public opinion, rather than autonomous actions accepted retroactively. 
Thus, the case of SDF involvement in UN peacekeeping operations aids the pluralist case of 
military policy acting in response to measured opinion.  
Discussion  
When considering that Japan’s government may have been shaping public opinion, the consistent 
rise in measured support for national defense and UN peacekeeping efforts may seem to be the 
result of a “reassurance strategy” (Midford, 2011: 18). The theory asserts that elites’ political 
actions deliberately exceed the realm of public support for militaristic policy when taking 
measures to remilitarize. A significant amount of time after militaristic actions and legislation are 
initiated, the citizenry recognizes that elites have maintained control over the SDF’s broadened 
activities. After adjusting to the further militarized SDF, the public’s view of acceptable 
militarism is inflated, paving the way for elites to exceed the realm of public support again in 
their next actions, and thus continuing the cycle of “reassurance” (Midford, 2011: 18). In matters 
of national security and UN PKOs, results indicate that the implementation of policy has 
corresponded with rising levels of measured support (see Figures 5 and 7). However, in these 
cases, government actions have not exceeded measured support. Rather, polls have indicated 
support before actions have been implemented. Thus, while reassurance strategy would suggest 
that the connected rise in measured support and government actions is the result of elitist shaping 
of public opinion, the pluralist nature of policy formation in these areas suggests a more 
democratic model. 
 
Reassurance is also likely inapplicable to the strengthening of Japan’s military, as Figures 2 and 
3 indicate no relationship between measured opinion and policy formation. However, it is 
conceivable that reassurance is responsible for the current resurgence in support for amending 
Article 9 after the monumental Peace and Security laws in 2015. The government has enjoyed 
about three years to prove it can control an SDF armed with the legislative means to engage in 
combat, as it now can with the United States as collective self-defense and in UN Peacekeeping 
missions. Thus, majority support for amending the constitution may be related to confidence in 
the ability of Japan to control a conventional military, after the citizenry has accepted the 
government’s ability to maintain control over the newly loosened reins of the SDF. 
 
In general, the study indicates that public opinion polls have accepted expanding the use of the 
SDF for international non-combative operations and protecting Japanese territory, without 
supporting expansion of the force’s military capability or freedom to engage in combat for 
reasons not pertaining to national defense. The cases of Japan’s budget, increasing the capability 
to defend Japan, participation in UN PKOs, and retaliation against piracy and terrorism present 
strong cases for pluralism, and thus Japan’s representative democracy. However, comparisons of 
support for militarization to applicable legislation and military composition suggest strongly 
elitist policy formation, as government measured polls have never demonstrated majority support 
(内閣府, 2012). Arguably, democratic governance may not require obedience toward every 
public poll. However, in a system of government in which those elected to power are meant to 
represent the will of the people, it is alarming that remilitarizing policies and actions have not 
once been supported by government measured opinion. 
 
While policy categories presenting pluralism (see Figures 4–7) outnumber those that indicate 
elitist policy formation (see Figures 2 and 3), the first and second categories are the most directly 
related to the question of this research. Accumulation of personnel and weaponry, and the 
acquisition of legislative freedom to engage with fewer combative and territorial restrictions, has 
transformed the SDF into a more conventionally powerful military force. Therefore, results 
suggest that Japan’s militarization has been, in its most pertinent aspects, the product of elitists 
failing to represent the measured will of the electorate. However, the government has displayed 
pluralist restraint by respecting measured opinion gathered regarding policy areas that impact the 
ability of the SDF to conduct non-combative and defensive operations. Thus, the relationship 
between government-measured public opinion and policy formation suggests an inconsistent 
state of democratic representation in Japan’s remilitarization. 
 
Recent events have confirmed the future relevancy of this study’s findings, as Japan’s 
remilitarization continues. While Japan has not had aircraft carriers since the Second World War, 
the country is in possession of a set of helicopter carriers. The largest of Japan’s warships, the 
Izumo helicopter carrier, is under consideration for a conversion to be compatible with US 
Marines F-35B stealth fighters, which are engineered for vertical takeoff (JMSDF, 2018; 
Nobuhiro and Kelly, 2017). The modification’s political ramifications would be significant, as 
transformation into an aircraft carrier would make it difficult for the government to assert the 
ship’s defensive nature. Helicopters have use in humanitarian and natural disaster missions, 
including search and rescue. The primarily offensive nature of the stealth fighters would more 
clearly violate the pacifist provisions of Article 9, stressing the boundaries through which the 
SDF is currently tolerated under defensive aims (Nobuhiro and Kelly, 2017). As Prime Minister 
Abe recently announced a plan to revise Article 9 by the year 2020, public support for revision 
will play a large role in whether the SDF will become constitutionally legitimized. If the revision 
succeeds, current restraints on remilitarization may loosen, highlighting the question as to 
whether the Japanese public will wield proper pluralist influence in this decision (Yakushiji, 
2017). 
 
Future analyses regarding the democratic merit of Japan’s remilitarization should discuss the 
responsibility of officials to both honor public opinion and respond appropriately to national 
security threats. In addition, works considering domestic and foreign motivations for 
remilitarization should consider that internal actors may have used external pressure as 
justification for their own hawkish interests. The scope of this study is also limited by the 
exclusion of public opinion polls tracking general satisfaction with the SDF, which would 
indicate if gradual militarization has resulted in greater public acceptance of the military. 
Additionally, obtaining and reporting opinion polls regarding the public reaction to specific 
instances of SDF deployment would shed greater light on the relationship between public 
support and duration of deployment, providing another context for public policy influence. 
Future work should seek to address these and other methods of historically analyzing public 
support for the SDF and its activities, to further understand how public opinion has responded to 
and influenced the militarization of Japan’s Self Defense Forces.  
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